Abstract

Given the advancements in technology today, a lot of things that were dimmed impossible a few years back have now been made possible, one of which is human cloning. While many people may argue that, human cloning will be a luxury afforded to only the people of affluence, hence It is not an important social or ethical issue. I believe it is an issue that needs to be addressed nonetheless. Something to consider is as technology becomes cheaper, it stands to reason that when human cloning finally is started and perfected, it could be afforded by the average person. This paper examines the ethical implications of making and using such technology; It also addresses other problems it signifies for society.

Background

Many hold that making human cloning technology would be wrong and would just upset the natural balance of things. However, some are also of the opinion that if the use of such machines can be properly regulated, it could potentially do a lot of good for mankind. For instance, infertile couples who long for a biological child. We shall hence analyze the actions of the stakeholders involved in the making and use of such technology. Before discussing the morality of human cloning as a whole, it is important to make a distinction between the types of cloning. As of now there are three types of cloning; digital mind cloning, therapeutic cloning and the reproductive cloning. Digital mind cloning in this context is how to incorporate different cognitive engagements of human-based work and activities, into a digital space that could interact with a human user. Digital mind cloning is in other words, is the representation of a self in digital form (Fujita 217).

Therapeutic Cloning involves removing the DNA from an embryo and re-placing it with the DNA from a cell removed from an individual. The resultant embryo would be allowed to grow for perhaps 14 days (Magney 70). Its stem cells would then be extracted and encouraged to grow into a piece of human tissue or a complete human organ for transplant (Pynes 128). It is used as a cure for diseased organs. Before the embryo is induced with the cell removed from the individual the somatic cells in the embryo have to be reprogrammed to accept induced pluripotent stem cell (iPS). This iPS cell is not a direct cell taken from the individual it has to be engineered from the original cell through study of gene, protein expression, and disease pathways. It will create a cell with the same DNA but less susceptible to the initial disease, the reason for this procedure. Reproductive cloning is what the average person would refer to as human cloning. It involves making an entire human clone instead of just a mental copy like in digital mind cloning or just tissues and organs in therapeutic cloning.

While human cloning is still a long way from being a reality, some remarkable progress have been made in animal cloning. In a lab in South Korea, Dr. Hwang leads in team of scientist that clones dogs, anyone who loves their dog that much and has $100,000 to spare can get their favourite dog cloned. The first cloned dog was done in 2005 and since then they’ve turned this into a legitimate business. A caveat should be stated from the outset, regardless of the progress made in animal cloning. The risk of congenital anomalies and neurological damage, make it reasonable to hold that it would be wrong to attempt human cloning of any kind at this time (Strong 45). Given this, the kind of human cloning this paper is mostly concerned with is digital mind cloning and a more futuristic version of body cloning (therapeutic and reproductive cloning), in which the embryo does not need to be put into a woman’s womb, and the gestation period can be cut down drastically to just a few days, by the use of some kind of device. Assuming this technology exists and can do this with as a little a risk as that involved in procreation by sexual intercourse or that of getting a brain scan in the case of digital cloning. Given this assumption, would human cloning be ethically justifiable in any circumstance? Scenarios and motives we will be considering will be more plausible and realistic ones. Unlike the following examples: cloning an army of yourself to take over the world, creating clones of people in power to take over the world and many more sprung from a mind of paranoia or a from a misconception of how human cloning works. Yes, these are possibilities, of how this technology could be misused, but are unrealistic as I have previously stated. A more likely scenario for digital mind cloning, would be cloning the mind of a person with any kind of neurodegenerative disease like Alzheimer, ALS, Parkinson and Huntington in it’s early onsets, so as to preserve their memories and sense of self. Would a scenario such as this, make a compelling enough ethical argument as to the need to make such technology and to make it public or an option for medical professionals? If such a technology already exists would a scenario like that make it ethically justifiable to use such technology? Here’s another scenario, A man who has no relatives and is in dire of an organ transplant, his last resort is therapeutic cloning. Since such technology and some medical professionals have the expertise to do so, would it be morally justifiable for him to do so as a last resort? Another scenario, “A woman that is unable to produce ova, and the man is unable to produce spermatozoa. Like many couples, they want to have a child genetically related to at least one of them. One approach to having genetically related children would involve using sperm and ova donated by family members, but suppose that no family members are available in this case. Let us assume, in other words, that cloning using a cell nucleus from one member of the couple is the only way they could have a child genetically related to one of them” (45).

Whether cloning in scenarios like or identical to one of the scenarios previously mentioned is ethical or not will be the subject matter of this paper. This paper aims to show that making such technology should not come under moral scrutiny, whether we use it is what we aim to prove is ethically unjustifiable.

Digital Mind Cloning

If the expertise exists to make a digital mind clone of the human mind, in a sense this technology copies ones consciousness, feelings, emotions and memories onto a computer that would think and act just like the person would, should this be an area in which scientists should dabble in? Put differently, is making such technology ethically permissible? In my opinion, the making of such technology is ethical. If we say it is not, it becomes a slippery slope, where any form of technology that can be used potentially for evil becomes unethical. Knowing that anything has a potential to be an instrument for evil, we would end up not advancing at all technologically. The making of such technology poses some interesting dilemmas which we shall investigate in this section. The goal of this section however, is to present a convincing argument against the ethicality of the use of such technology and not question the ethical implications of the making.

Should a Digital Mind Clone have Human Rights?

This leads to the question, what makes an average human? Simplistically, to be a human you need a physical presence, you need to not be superhuman—in the sense that you can be hurt, you need a mind, you need to have feelings, and these feelings should shape how you react to things and see the world. A digital mind clone is on a computer which represents a physical presence, it can be hurt in the sense that the computer can be destroyed, which means it’s not superhuman, it has somewhat of a mind, albeit a representation of someone else’s, but from the moment it is put on a different body i.e. the computer it begins to have its own experiences which ultimately will shape it into a different being, based on this we can say that a digital mind clone is as good as a human.

Based on our earlier simplification of being human, one could argue that from a utilitarian perspective that, this would be ethical because it poses more good than harm, for individuals and for the general society. If such an argument is made, then it would seem we have not considered more than the surface value of rights to the digital mind clone. If a digital mind clone is given human rights, people with mental or neurological ailments can use them as a way to continue living even with their condition, they’d be able to make proper and informed decisions regarding their personal lives and also use them as a way to remember/relive old, lost or forgotten memories. If they don’t have human rights since it is a being this will shape how it engages the world, it would consider itself less privileged and discriminated against as a normal human would. This in turn, will shape the decisions it helps the original individual make, hence it may include parameters and emotions in making decisions that are not present in the original human which defeats the purpose of having them. So it would seem to be beneficial to both parties involved (The original and the clone) for the clone to have human rights.

However, a flaw exists in the earlier simplification of what makes a human. We stated that a digital mind clone is not superhuman because it can be destroyed through the computer it is on. But unless it is a dedicated hardware, in the sense that the digital mind clone is hardcoded into one computer and cannot be put into another then its lifespan is unlimited which means it is somewhat superhuman. Another failure in the earlier simplification, is even though it could somehow process emotions these emotions are not directly linked to the digital mind clone itself, if I hit the computer the digital mind clone is not gonna yell“ Ow!” Hence, it should not have human rights as it is not a good enough representation of what being human is in actuality.

Giving a digital mind clone human rights is as good as giving all our devices rights. This means we can’t obviously buy them or sell them; we can’t drop them or treat them like devices or tools to make our life better in which they are. This defeats the purpose of having them. Based on this, we can therefore say it is unethical to give digital mind clones equal rights as a human being.

All other perspectives such as Kantianism and Virtue ethics, are concerned with people, of which we have already proved a digital mind clone is not. Hence they do not apply.

The Ethics of Using Digital Mind Cloning Technology

Virtue ethics is not as straightforward to apply as, say, utilitarianism or Kantianism. The approach is certainly different and starts with the question, “What sort of person should I be?” One way of approaching ethical dilemmas is to ask“What would a virtuous person do?” It seems that there is no good reason to think that this is the kind of action that the virtuous person would do or not do, in order to achieve some measure of human flourishing. It is difficult to argue for or against cloning as a whole from a virtue ethic’s position, hence no analysis will be done from this perspective. Instead, we will analyze this from a utilitarian and a Kantian perspective.

From a utilitarian perspective, if we were to make technology that enables people to make digital mind clones, assuming it will be cheap and affordable to the average man; it will help a lot of people suffering from mental and neurological diseases which has previously been mentioned. The benefit counts as good and not harm from the utilitarian perspective. On the other hand, from the perspective of the non-user, i.e., the family of the user, if the original person is deceased this could potentially help the family and friends deal with the loss of the individual. This may be considered as another benefit of making a digital mind clone. However, just like anything with a great potential for good, the tendency of this technology to be abused is also great. For instance, non-users could use it as a replacement for their deceased instead of just as a means to Another way it can be abused is that it could also give people a move on.

motive to invade your privacy, checking your personal computer, knowing that your mind clone is on it, making it remarkably easier for them to find out any-thing about you and how you think. Having a digital mind clone opens up a whole slue of problems with the hackers. It gives hackers something else to look for when accessing your personal computer through malicious means. Even the government could make it mandatory for every citizen of the country to have a digital mind clone. Speculating even further, they could use these digital mind clones to statistically determine who is more likely to commit a crime, which leads to another brand of privacy invasion. Imagine the police come busting down your door, you ask: “What did I do?”, They respond with “You are likely to kill someone.” It leads us into an era where the thought of committing a crime could very well get you arrested, which everyone would agree is wrong. Hence, a utilitarian looking at the pros and cons of making a digital mind clone, would be led to conclude that it is unethical.

Kantian deontology looks at our intrinsic sense of good. It follows the following premises:

  • Premise 1: Make it a universal law without contradiction.
  • Premise 2: We treat all humanity as an end in and of themselves.
  • Conclusion: The action is good/ethical.

Applying this onto the morality of creating a digital mind clone, we get no obvious contradictions with the first premise and with the second premise.

However, caution must be used when making such technology available to everyone. We may fall into an era where humans become disposable and all we need is the mind. Such technology could very easily lead humanity to the brink of extinction. If the opportunity presented itself that allows us to be free from all physical ailments, by getting rid of our mortal bodies from the start then what do we need these human bodies for? Another attack on the ethics of making a digital mind clone may come from attacking the second premise again. One could argue that the making of a digital mind clone indirectly objectifies human beings, and as a result uses them to an end which is the clone itself(Pence 73). Hence a Kantian would agree with the utilitarian on this front, stating that the making of digital mind clones is unethical.

Body Cloning

For simplicity’s sake, both therapeutic cloning and reproductive cloning are combined and analyzed in this section. Body cloning in this case, does not simply mean cloning the human body without mind.It is used just as a simplistic term for cloning an entire human being, mind and body.

“If philosophers are going to apply ethical theory successfully to practical issues, they must first have a theory. This may seem obvious; but they often proceed as if it were not so.”(Hare 201)

“The person is a subject, a moral agent, autonomous and self-governing. An object is a non-person, not treated as a self-governing moral agent[By] objectification of persons,’ we mean, roughly, “what Kant would not want us to do.””(Pence 73)

“It is certainly possible that there may be no substantial benefits to society that would result if body cloning were to become a reality. Yet this would constitute a good argument for prohibition only if considerable harms are a likely consequence.”(Macklin 147)

The three quotes that begin this section highlight three important issues that is tied into any practical discussion about body cloning, whether the cloning is for research or therapeutic purposes or is purely for reproductive purposes. The first is simply the problem of what ethical theory is the right one for public policy decisions in a democratic society. Since I am not concerned with defending any particular moral theory at this time, I will not argue the merits of one theory over another.

What seems to be the best for everyone involved in the cloning debate is an incorporation of as many ethical theories as possible without falling into a contradiction. In the course of this section, I shall highlight some of the ethical issues raised by the making of technology that allows us to clone entire human beings in a relatively short time and without the risk and time overhead of insemination. After this I shall go ahead to analyze the ethics of making the technology that allows for the creation of human clones and the ethics of its use. Like with digital mind cloning, I am of the position that the pursuit of knowledge is independent of its applications/uses. Hence to me, the making of technology that allows for the making of body clones should not to be put under ethical scrutiny, the use of such technology is what we shall question thoroughly.

Individuality & Autonomy

In the case of therapeutic cloning and other forms of cloning, that involve using the clone as a means to an end; the clone is stripped of their autonomy and individuality. A clone in this sense, lives only for the purpose of others. For instance, clones that are created for body parts, they are created but lose their right to choose whether or to be involved in such a process. This section analyses this loss of autonomy to the clone. I personally believe by all accounts if a body clone is created, it should have the same rights as a human does. However on this topic of autonomy, I find that creating body clones with the intention of using them as a means to an end is unethical, which is what I set out to prove in this section.

To determine the rightness or wrongness of an action, utilitarianism seeks to maximize pleasure for the people involved and minimize pain. In utilitarianism however, autonomy appears to have its value only in its existence as a means to the greater goal of maximizing pleasure for the individual or parties involved. The assumption being that the person wants to be an autonomous being. This observation raises the question of whether or not a utilitarian agent could be robbed of his or her autonomy with no objections raised, this removal would have to be considered to be in the interest of the agent’s well-being or other parties involved. In the case of body cloning, when analyzing the decision to get a human clone how does one weigh their autonomy and individuality? Samuel Scheffler’s agent-centred prerogative is able to provide utilitarianism with a way to value autonomy such that the conflict between the well-being of an agent and the agent’s autonomy would be rendered impossible. Many philosophers have written papers directly or indirectly addressing this issue. Bernard Williams and J. L. Mackie consider autonomy to be fatally wounded by utilitarianism. Peter Singer and John Stuart Mill, however, consider autonomy to be merely infringed upon by the justifiable demands of the moral theory. However, Scheffler finds a solution for this with his agent-centred prerogative.

Scheffler points out that the accusation that a moral theory is too demanding is made for one of two reasons. The first reason is that the theory allows for a minimal number of options of morally right behaviour. For example, a Kantian who has a gun pointed to his head and another placed in his hand, is told to take the life of another person or they will be killed. There are two possible courses of action that could taken, but none of them seems devoid of moral violation. If the person complies, he commits a moral wrong by killing. If he refuses, he commits a moral wrong by endangering his own life. The second reason that a theory may be accused of being too demanding is that its requirements result in too much cost to the agent. For example, a form of utilitarianism that strictly requires an individual to perform only those acts which will bring the greatest good to the greatest number would demand that an agent forgo his desire to pay rent to his landlord at the deadline of 5:00 P.M., so as to avoid his Family’s eviction, if presented with the chance to distribute food to hundreds of starving people at exactly the same time. Another instance, cloning yourself poses obvious good for yourself and the parties involved i.e. family and friends as they get to have more time with you, and since they’re two or more of you, you could be in multiple places spending time with different people simultaneously which brings more pleasure to the party involved. Scheffler realizes that, in cases such as these, morality’s demands seem overbearing. He does believe that morality is deserving of its impersonal aspect, but feels that the most appropriate moral point-of-view is one that is agent-centred, at the heart of which should rest the agent-centred prerogative.

Revealing the nature of the agent-centred prerogative, Scheffler notes that it permits each agent “to devote a certain proportionately greater weight to his or her own projects than would be licensed by an exclusive appeal to an impersonal calculus” (Scheffler 104). By granting more weight to the agent’s own personal outcomes, the agent-centered prerogative lightens the obligation to the “all”that is called for in utilitarian theory. Adding this component to the theory makes it far more readily abided by, as without this adjustment, an agent’s own concerns and happiness could quite often “lose out,” under circumstances the likes of which Williams and Mackie describe. Therefore applying Scheffler’s agent-centred prerogative as the form of utilitarianism in this case is the way to go, as it is the only form that places value on individuality and autonomy. Hence from the agent-centred prerogative body Cloning would be unethical as it requires the agent to sacrifice our individuality.

Unlike utilitarianism at the heart of Kantianism is the position that rational human wills are autonomous. Kant saw this as the key to understanding and justifying the authority moral requirements have over us. Considering Kant’s second categorical imperative: “ ...treat humanity, whether in ourselves or in others, as never a means only but always as an end in itself”. Loosing ones individuality may be considered harm to ones self as it means you loose your identity. Hence with the second categorical imperative, this falls under harm to oneself which is considered wrong. The third categorical imperative: “the Idea of the will of every rational being as a will that legislates universal law” (“Kant’s Moral Philosophy” 5). Although Kant does not state this as an imperative as he does in the other formulations, it is easy enough to put it in that form: Act so that through your maxims you could be a legislator of universal laws. This sounds very similar to the first formulation. However, in this case we focus on our status as universal law givers rather than universal law followers. This is of course the source of the very dignity of Humanity Kant speaks of in the second formulation. Applying this thought to the body Cloning, we quickly fall into the scenario where the clones will and actions are not theirs rather are those of the of the original person. Based on this, a Kantian would say it is wrong to create a person who has no control over their actions, will and preferences. Therefore body Cloning may be considered unethical as it violates the second and third categorical imperative.

Given that with both perspectives, we conclude that a side-effect of body Cloning, loss of autonomy, is unethical we can then apply this unto the main issue of body Cloning which would as well be considered unethical.

The Ethical Implications of Making Body Cloning Technology

This section is concerned more with what making this technology means for society as a whole. Unlike digital mind cloning technology, the possibilities for harm is too great to simply put a rubber stamp on the making of such technology in the name of knowledge and research. This section in essence, seeks to persuade the reader still that the making of such technology is worth more than enough good to society and the scientific community. Hence said good should outweigh the potential for harm.

First we shall do hedonic calculus on this action, following the principle of utility. The most obvious good this technology poses, is scientific advancements and for people who need it. For instance, with therapeutic cloning, doctors would be able to make replacement bones, and body parts that need replacing. As a result of this technology we would have longer lifespan, instead of treating diseases we would just replace the defected body part, we would be near immortals.

Another advantage is the chance for people with defective genes and infertile couples to have children as they could just clone someone with their consent of course. However looking at the disadvantages of having such technology out in the world, we face the problem of societal harm. Making such technology available to the public, means anyone would be allowed to clone themselves, this could potentially upset the natural order of things and leave the human gene pool worse off than it is with regular human reproductive methods. The concept of family would as well have to be redefined, motherhood and fatherhood would have to change as well as the cultural heritage of particular and families.Most importantly there will be something lost in family relations that will harm the family and hence society as a whole. Another disadvantage to be considered is how is such research going to be conducted? Is it going to be conducted by the government ? If it is some people will be of the opinion that it is a waste or improper use of public funds see how far we are from making this kind of technology. Another possible harm to society is “...one that is, in many ways, counterintuitive. Calling human cloning the new eugenics and then claiming that it is a harm is something that is a bit strange” (Pynes 81). Eugenics comes from the greek word Eugene, or wellborn, this refers to the concept of the creation of an elitist society, where if you are considered defected in some way, or have traits that are undesirable, would mean you are excluded from the gene pool as more people with such desirable traits would be cloned and used for natural reproduction. And for the maker until this technology is completely perfected it cannot be released to the public, otherwise, they’d be getting law-suits and reports everyday of how their machine, screwed up the cloning process, because the clone did not grow up as expected. Based on the pros and cons highlighted I leave it to my readers to make the decision of ethicality.

A Kantian agent on the other hand, would say the making of body cloning technology is ethical. Kantianism looks at the intention behind the action. Hence under Kantianism there are good actions with bad consequences and bad actions with good consequences. If the reason for the creation of this technology is for scientific advancements and to help people whom need this technology and have no have no other options, then a Kantian would consider this ethical as it does not violate any of the categorical imperatives.

An agent of the Aristotelian virtue ethics would ask, “How does this making of such technology help us flourish or grow as human beings?” Aristotle has always been all for scientific advancements, as far it does not impede on our moral virtues, in his book Nicomachean Ethics, he states that knowledge is an important part of flourishing. Looking at the making of such technology, there’s no reason to believe that it hinders growth into the phronomos. Hence under virtue ethics the making of such technology, would be considered ethical.

The Ethical Implications of Making Body Clones

“The unique and distinctive ethical issues raised by the use of somatic cell nu-clear transfer to create children related to, for example, serious safety concerns, individuality, family integrity, and treating children as objects.” ((NBAC) 3-4) The quote from the NBAC encompasses what they take to be the best ar-guments against body cloning. Whether or not one is an act or rule utilitarian, there is the justifiable objection to body cloning using the notion of harm. Harm to the clone, harm to the original and other parties involved. The harm argument can be posed in two forms; physical harm, and psychological harm. The psychical harm argument has to do with harm to the clone itself, in the sense that there is something about being a clone that is harmful to the clone. There are several forms of this argument, but the strongest one I believe to come from the NBAC report, when extracted it goes as follows:

  1. If an action, will probably cause harm to others without a desirable goal, then it is wrong to perform the action.
  2. The use of cloning techniques will probably cause harm to the child (clone).
  3. Therefore, It is wrong to use cloning techniques to create a child (clone).

Most often, people tend to attack 1. with the notion of surgery or dental work that involves immediate harm, but I have modified the argument by including the phrase: “desirable goal”. This modification defeats that argument, simply by stating that such dental work and surgery provide a desirable end. Bringing it home, one could then argue saying, that body cloning has a desirable end, the cloned child. But they forget to consider that there are more than one party involved in the matter, yes it is a desirable end for the cloner(the origi-nal person). However, looking at the situation from the clone’s perspective, we would have to consider Scheffler’s agent-centred prerogative as the form of utilitarianism for analysis, because it is one of the few ethical theories that value the independency and individuality of a person. Hence from the clone’s perspective, you’d be doing psychological damage, creating them without a unique identity and other psychological issues which we shall soon see.

The psychological harm argument against body cloning also comes in various forms, but there is one version that is considered the strongest and has been reused over and over again in several papers and I think is worth restating here. S⊘ren Holm from the University of Copenhagen, presents a version of the psychological harm argument he calls “A Life in the Shadow” argument, which I believe is the strongest and most used form of the psychological harm argument.

Holm starts off with a standard psychological observation, about people and how they react to newborns. When a child is born we as questions like:

“How will it develop? or What kind of person will it become? and we usually answer in some kind of psychological way...I hope that he won’t get the kind of temper you had when your were a child!” (S⊘ren 160) Holm argues that, it is wrong to be able to say with a high degree of certainty how your child is going to turnout to be as opposed to regular children, of which we are completely unsure. Holm believes that knowing these answers will be a huge influence in how the child(clone) is raised. And due to the general tendency to believe in the truth of genetics, Holm states: “it is likely that the parents of the clone will already have formed in their minds a quite definite picture of how the clone will develop, a picture that is based on the actual development of the original”(162). He goes on to highlight more problems, “at every point in the clone’s life there would be someone who had already lived that life, with whom the clone could be compared and against whom the clone’s accomplishments could be measured” (162).

Some may claim the important question that Holm did not necessarily answer but implicitly states is wrong: “What is wrong with a life in the shadow?”. My answer and I believe Holm’s answer as well is that it diminishes the clone’s possibility of living a life that is in some sense full, “...therefore as long as genetic essentialism is a common cultural belief there are good reasons not to allow human cloning” (S⊘ren 162).

In Rosalind Hursthouse paper on Virtue Theory, and Abortion she highlights three principles of virtue ethics which I shall use in the analysis of body Cloning from an Aristotelian perspective. The principles are as follows:

P1: An action is right if and only if it is what a virtuous agent would do in the circumstances.

P1a: A virtuous agent is one who acts virtuously, that is, one who has an exercise the virtues.

P2: A virtue is a character trait a human being needs to flourish or live well.

P1 develops a theoretic link between the right action and a virtuous person, while P1a explains what a virtuous person is. The second principle, P2, provides the link between virtue and flourishing as human being or eudaemonia. This gives us a way to get right action connected with being a virtuous person in a way that is both efficient, simplistic and compelling. In her article, Hursthouse is discusses the morality of abortion, and in that paper she argues that there are two areas of concentration when making arguments for and against abortion: first is the status of the fetus and second is women’s rights. She rightly claims,“If one thinks within this familiar framework, one may well be puzzled about what virtue theory, as such, could contribute” (Hursthouse 144). The same thing can be said of the body Cloning debate if we replace the fetus with a clone. If the cloning debate is pushed towards the angle of the moral status of the clone or in terms of reproductive rights of the original person, then there does not seem to be a lot that virtue theory can contribute; however, if we redefine the argument, what we have is more informative to those trying to decide whether making a human clone is morally justifiable or not.

If one knows that a family cannot have a healthy biological child any way other than by cloning, then this seems to be the kind of support that one would give from a virtue ethics position. Of course there is the obvious reply that they can always adopt a child instead of cloning a child, but in a footnote, Hursthouse states, “In this connection I also discuss adoption and the sense in which it may be regarded as second best,’ and the difficult question of whether the good of parenthood may properly be sought, or indeed bought, by surrogacy”(Hursthouse 241). So even though Hursthouse thinks that there are cases in which abortion may not be the best way to flourish, there are cases in which it is morally acceptable for the virtuous person to have an abortion.

I take it that the strongest defence of reproductive cloning, for a virtue theorist of the type of Aristotle or Hursthouse, will come in the form of claiming that reproduction of an offspring is important to human flourishing. However, in the modern world, there are many people and many ways that one could grow as a moral human being or live well without having children at all. Since there is this plurality of flourishing options, it serves as evidence that one need not have children by means of cloning. Therefore virtue ethicist would not approve of body cloning.

The major objections, against body cloning from a Kantian perspective come from the failure to abide to the categorical imperative of autonomy which has been covered in the individuality and autonomy section, hence will not be restated. However based on this, I hope to have convinced my reader that body cloning is unethical. Thus, these arguments posed allows us to fault the morality of using body cloning as a whole from three different perspectives. This leads me to conclude that regardless of how you use it if such technology exists it will be unethical to use it.

Conclusion

Cloning whether body or mind, whether for science or for reproduction, there are many factors that should influence our moral assessment of issue. I have presented primarily three of the dominant ethical theories. In the final analysis I have shown that the moral implication falls upon the user of the technology and not the makers. This is to say that as an individual when using this technology, one must think hard so as to make sure that this is not the only option, because if it is then you’d be faced with the dilemma of doing whats brings you the most pleasure and what is truly ethical. What one needs to remember is that technology is not going to get worse or disappear, and the biological and technological advancements are going to become greater and occur more often. Based on arguments made for and against the ethics of making clones and making the technology itself I conclude on this note: under most circumstances it would be unethical to make body or digital mind clones, however the making of such technology is ethically permissible.

Works Cited

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